So, where’s the nearest womb?
Now the festive spirit is draining my mind and body it’s as good a time as any to return to interrogating the ethics of childbirth. Dr Gerald Harrison and Dr Julia Tanner have a piece inside the journal Think that extols the values of antinatalism. This helps justify my view that the philosophy is on the rise – and, indeed, relevant – but it’s not too convincing a paper. It makes several arguments for thinking it is “both wrong and unjustified” to procreate…
It’s bad for animals.
Humans, the authors write, are “the most destructive creatures on the planet“: “caus[ing] vast numbers of animal deaths“, destroying habitats and altering the climate. Under Harrison and Tanner’s logic, however, this destructiveness is a veritable boon! As we shall go on to see, they believe that childbirth unjustly forces life upon another and is more likely to be to their misfortune than advantage. If we’re to accept this, and acknowledge that all other species will go on to blindly procreate for millenia, our extirpative habits are to be welcomed and maintained.
If we don’t accept this but accept the notion that we (a) aren’t exceptional and (b) have a duty to consider other species it remains unconvincing. First, it’s just not practical: if you cared enough about wildlife that you’d deny yourself a child to preserve it you’d ensure that future generations were the spawn of people who don’t share your opinions. To maintain your anti-speciesist environmentalism it could be more sensible to breed and replicate your views. Besides, even if it was a good pragmatic policy, we’d need a metric to suggest our lives are less valuable than those of other species. Even the most impartial of utilitarians needs a calculus. (That could be the least erotic sentence ever set to paper/screen.)
It’s bad for the species.
Harrison and Tanner grapple with the view that humanity has “value in itself” but dismiss it as we’re causing the extinction of different species. Losing one, then, would preserve a good few others. This assumes that if species have value they must have the same value. The varying sophistication of each species’ consciousness makes this seem doubtful. Indeed, the authors seem to have unwittingly released a scarlet fish: lots of people who impute value to the human species feel that it’s exceptional. I’ve yet to grapple with these folk – and, thus, have been idly assuming that we’re not – but the views of Scruton, Smith and others shouldn’t be ignored. (Well – except on music, perhaps.)
It’s bad for the child.
The authors admit that most people would say they’d rather have lived than not but argue that we’re “heavily biased towards the positive“. As I’ve written before, I’m not sure that it really matters: if we feel happy what’s the beef? Paranoiacs are biased towards being fearful. That doesn’t mean they don’t really feel scared.
Once again the most compelling argument seems to be that (a) you impose life on an unconscious other and (b) what with the visceral pain and emotional despair that haunts so many lives the risk is that they’re bound, likely or liable to experience rather more suffering than pleasure. Many nonbelievers – like, say, Grayling or Baggini – hold there’s no objective purpose to being and that “the meaning of your life is the meaning you give it“. If a salesman was reeling off the merits of a product you’d probably ask him what it’s function was. If he said “its function is the function you give it” but its range of capacities stretched to, say, holding a burger or crushing CDs I’d guess that you’d be unimpressed. Similarly, if the meaning of life is the meaning you give it but most or even some people can make little but an existence scarred by torment, despair or deprivationone must ask if there’s a purpose to continuing life.
December 29, 2010 at 7:22 am
Can I just poke a few holes in this?
Firstly, its possible for a couple to reproduce whilst contributing to population reduction. The replacement rate for a stable population is about 2.3 children per family. Its possible to have a single child, or even two, without contributing to population growth.
Secondly, the idea that your children will grow to espouse identical ideology to you is a bit odd. I certainly don’t mirror my parent’s. One of the reasons that I imagine support is growing for antinatalism in Western societies is their relative enlightenment and the various, positive reasons for supporting that principle from a moral or environmental perspective. Evidence to support this can be found by inspecting those ranked against antinatalism: religious wingnuts and neoliberal economists.
xx
December 29, 2010 at 2:31 pm
Well poked!
The first point seems reasonable. A shrinking population that was cognisant of a threat could still be supplanted/bossed about by growing ones that were’t. Then again, if the threats of resource depletion etc. are as grave as is suggested there’s not a lot of time for civilisations to expand.
As for the latter, well, not identical – and, of course, there’s plenty of exceptions – but I think that as a general trend children will replicate the habits of their parents. So, if I’d not been raised in a house where recycling was the norm there’s less of a chance that I’d have done it myself. Still, I see your point that some philosophies become more popular just because their times demand them. That weighs of against the human’s skills of self-delusion.
December 30, 2010 at 9:39 am
You’re implying that a larger population could be bossed around by a smaller one. But there’s a whole host of other factors which influence national power and could invalidate that argument, although I sympathise with the underlying truth of your point. Ultimately, all these factors depend upon the importance of the nation state as the fundamental geopolitical unit and, as we’re talking about a global issue, factors operating over any other scale are pretty much irrelevant. Ultimately, most nations are secure and unthreatened by aggression and so a shrinking population, providing it doesn’t shrink excessively, is pretty safe. The desirable (i.e. sustainable) population of any nation is obviously debatable but I’m going to be brave and claim that, in most cases, it is lower than the current figure. Obviously this is the case for the UK. NZ appears to be unique, in my experience, by initiating a discussion of the desirable population before it is likely to be reached.
As for resource depletion being as grave as suggested, the truth of that is going to become increasingly clear over the coming years. A lot of harbingers are there if you have the time and effort to conduct a reasonably thorough review of the matter.
The point about inherited ideologies is a really interesting one. I’m pretty confident that, in Western civilisations, sufficient evidence is available to drive people towards the sustainable agenda, if not outright antinatalism. Certain ideologies directly oppose either sustainability (is glibertarianism an appropriate example of this?) or antinatalism (Catholics, Muslims). Some of these influences are ideological, some are cultural. Outside the Western sphere opposition to sustainability likewise falls under either category but is probably a lot more embedded. I imagine it is paricularly reinforced by poverty. As with pretty much all human problems, the answer seems to lie with the holy trinity of social and economic justice and education.
Fantastic subject, BTW. One of my passions. :~D
December 30, 2010 at 10:02 am
Sorry for double post but just ran across this from the PCI: http://www.postcarbon.org/article/198393-the-peak-oil-crisis-the-future
Obviously they’re not what you would call “objective” but I like their work.
December 31, 2010 at 3:55 am
I haven’t forgotten this thread and will return when morning comes. Or the afternoon, even. Why aren’t I asleep?
December 31, 2010 at 2:25 pm
(I’m not quoting you as a “fisk” or anything so wanky – just so it’s coherent.)
Perhaps (though if a shrinking population allows free/freeish migration a more fertile culture could replace it – not that I’m spreading ZOMG! EURABIA stuff it just makes sense that if some cultures share a space and one’s expanding while the other shrinks it’ll either change its habits or supplant the latter). The other point, of course, is that an ageing population could have unpleasant consequences (though there are some imaginative solutions). I guess that’s pretty much dependent on the rate.
Oh, yeah, I know – just leaving a bit of space for doubt to wriggle if need be!
As well as ideologies I’d add the self-interested confirmation biases of quite apolitical souls. At some times in history we’ve seen that people have been willing to endure deprivation, but it needed (a) a visible threat and (b) a great big propagandistic hammer (WW2, for example). Otherwise they’re willing to assume that there’s no problem or that it’s not all that serious (our their lives wouldn’t be able to continue as before). I’d discount (b) as a solution because I don’t trust the state and (a), sadly, won’t be a factor ’til the consequences are bringing a world of hurt. The nasty irony of resource depletion/climate change would be/has been that its first victims are people who’ve affected it least and can do sod all about it.
Yeah, it’s an interesting one! I almost asked my ‘rents to get me this book for me birthday but wasn’t sure they’d get the joke.
January 2, 2011 at 10:33 am
Hey, no worries about the quotes, cuz. I do enjoy a good Fisking! :~o
I’m pretty shattered from a day at the beach so I’m going to wuss out on replying now. Will be back on it tomoz.
zzzzzzzzzzzzz
January 2, 2011 at 7:06 pm
Oooh, a day at the beach…
*Shivers*
January 3, 2011 at 9:48 pm
[...] affect moral considerations; shake up our priorities and, perhaps, give some a reason not to end it all. If there’s the slightest validity to such ideas they’re about the most important thing [...]
January 11, 2011 at 1:58 pm
I have read the article and I think the criticisms don’t work.
First, they say that they are just providing some reasons to think procreation is wrong. They do not say they are all completely compatible.
One argument is about the amount of harm human procreation causes. Another is about consent. And so on.
They also directly address your point about breeding people who’ll hold your views.
I also think you’ve got their final argument completely wrong. They don’t argue that life is so full of suffering that you shouldn’t subject anyone to it. They argue that it a) there’s a risk of this and it is a risk you can avoid and b) (paraphrasing a bit) that if life is good for you it was still wrong to subject you to it because it is only justifiable to subject someone to a benefit when it is very great and to not do so would mean someone missed out.
SO I don’t think you’ve really addressed their arguments.
January 11, 2011 at 2:10 pm
Hi Abbie. Thanks for commenting,
But they do term these reasons a “case” and hold that it’s enough to convince one that it’s better not to have children. I don’t think it’s unfair to note that the case is incoherent, then.
Incidentally, there are more reasons to be sceptical of the view that a world without humans need be “better” for animals here.
They address the idea that the whole species could try and squeeze out nicer individuals but they don’t consider the problem that if our environmentally aware prospective parents go without children they’ll only supplanted by less conscientious folk.
True, but I’m not sure I’ve claimed otherwise (in fact, I think our expositions – mine is given in the final paragraph – are pretty much the same).
January 11, 2011 at 3:57 pm
Thanks for your reply. I agree with you about ‘squeezing out nicer individuals’. I will just quickly counter-reply.
I didn’t realise they said ‘case’. I read it as a shopping list of arguments, perhaps wrongly.
But I think you can make a case using arguments that are inconsistent with one another. Utilitarianism is inconsistent with a Kantian approach. But I can make a case against Xing by pointing out that utilitarianism condemns Xing and so does Kantianism. Haven’t I then made a good case for thinking Xing is wrong using arguments that are inconsistent with one another?
As I read them, this was sort of what they were doing: presented a roughly utilitarian case against procreation and then a Kant style one (with its focus on consent), and then an egoist one.
Take the utilitarian case. They argue that we humans cause more harm than good. The utility that we derive from living our lives is not as great as we think, but the harm we cause to other animals is very great.
I agree that if the lives of animals are just full of pain and suffering then our own amazing ability to destroy other lifeforms might be a force for good. But I didn’t see Harrison and Tanner claiming this. They do not claim that lives are full of pain and suffering (well, they sort of hint that human lives might contain more suffering than we think). So I don’t see why you think they should welcome our ‘destructive presence’. Our absence would increase the balance of benefits over harms. Agreed, this is an empirical claim that may well be challenged.
The Kantian case is that we do not consent to be born, and although consent is not always needed the exceptions are when someone will come to harm or when someone will be deprived (conditions not met for procreation).
As I understand you, you’re saying that if this is Kantian case is correct, then animals are also being wronged by being brought into existence and it would be better if all life became extinct? (And as we’re good at rendering life extinct we should continue breeding as usual).
But isn’t that to be a consequentialist about wrongdoing and so goes against the spirit of that argument? Our obligation is not to prevent procreative acts from occurring but is to not procreate ourselves.
They could also argue that this sort of Kantian argument really only applies to moral agents. You can only be wronged by a moral agent and so animals are not wronged when they are created. They do not make this sort of point, but they could.
I have gone on too long, sorry.
January 12, 2011 at 2:00 am
Haven’t I then made a good case for thinking Xing is wrong using arguments that are inconsistent with one another?
In some cases, yes, but if the Kantian point hinges upon a view of harm that’s inconsistent with the utilitarian point I think you’re on iffier ground. So, in Harrison and Tanner’s paper the utilitarian claim assumes that nonexistence – represented by the animal’s extinction – is a harm, yet their deontological argument holds – in fact, relies upon – the view that nonexistence isn’t a harm. To accept both arguments one has to have embraced both points and yet they’re wholly contradictory.
You’re right that my – facetious – claim that we should just continue to eliminate species does elide the two, however. (And I rather hope that isn’t all that’s wrong with it!)
I have gone on too long, sorry.
Oh, no worries – I like getting interesting comments.
January 12, 2011 at 12:38 pm
Hm, I don’t think that’s quite correct. They don’t think that the extinction of a species is a bad thing (they say this at the top of section 2) and were pointing out that ‘if’ someone does think extinction is a bad thing then humans happen to cause rather a lot of that sort of badness. But they didn’t endorse the idea themselves.
So their utilitarian argument assumes only that humans cause more harm than good. I agree that’s debatable.
I agree that their Kantian argument supposes non-existence is not a harm but as far as I can see this is consistent with their utilitarian argument.
I think they are saying that if non-existence is a harm, then it seems we ought not to procreate because we prevent such a lot of creatures from coming into existence (by rendering lots of species extinct).
But if non-existence is harmless then we ought not to procreate because procreating might be harmful to those it brings into existence and is harmful to others already in existence, and also violates a deontological constraint.
January 12, 2011 at 1:00 pm
I meant extinction in the more general sense of non-existence – from the death of an individual to, yes, the dying out of a species. See here…
Suggesting that “destroying habitats”, “destroy[ing] everything” and, indeed, for animals with no particular self-concept, “killing” are utilitarian harms presupposes there’s a value to existence.
I have a lot more sympathy with the argument as you’ve presented it in your last two paragraphs, in fact! But, again, I think the notion of human exceptionalism – we are, after all, with apes and dolphins trailing somewhere behind, far and away the most cognitively advanced species – deserves to be addressed. Depending on how one perceives the “value” of life – and it’s one of my nits to pick with this paper that it scarcely addresses it – human life could be said to have more than that of other species.
January 14, 2011 at 4:13 am
Apologies for being stubborn here but I found their case persuasive and so feel compelled to defend it.
I agree that their use of the word ‘destructive’ is a bit misleading I do not think it commits them to what you say it does. They claim that we destroy animal lives. They must assume that the animal is harmed by having its life destroyed. You say that this presupposes that there’s a value to existence. But they do not have to say that the value is intrinsic. They could claim that the value of existence derives from the fact – and this is suggested by something they say later – that animals ‘are invested in their lives and want them to continue’. They say that about humans and I suppose it is more difficult to say it about animals. But I think something similar could be said.
So it is good for the animal if its life continues. By destroying its life we harm the animal.
This does not commit Harrison and Tanner to the view that we should bring new life into existence (as far as I can see). There is no harm done if you do not procreate because by definition there is no-one who is invested in that life yet.
But if I’m wrong your interpretation still won’t really pose a problem, either on the utilitarian interpretation or the Kantian one.
If existence is good, it can still be better if some things don’t exist – things that would be an obstacle to other things existing. Hitler might have been very happy but his existence was an obstacle to the continued existence of many millions of others. I take it they are saying something similar about us humans. Our lives may be beneficial to us, but they are not beneficial overall because of the harm they cause.
Secondly, this is where their Kantian point can come in (and can complement – and not contradict – their utilitarian point). A Kantian thinks that even if a state of affairs would be good, that doesn’t automatically mean we ought to bring it about. There are deontological constraints on what we can bring about.
Harrison and Tanner’s point is that procreation violates a deontological constraint.
January 14, 2011 at 2:07 pm
No worries. Defend away!
Hmm – yes, I suppose they could. They’d be wrong – most animals aren’t nearly so intelligent – but that is at least a plausible interpretation.
Firstly that implies that all lives are equally valuable which I think is doubtful (because, again, even from a nontheistic perspective, one must admit that humans stand out from the crowd in the terms of cognitive sophistication). Even if we’re to accept that, I think this would push one to what I believe is termed context-dependent antinatalism (because some lives may be likely to cause more good than harm).
But, yes, I’ll admit that if we shove this argumentative tangle to one side Harrison and Tanner’s deontological case stands up pretty well. (It might compromise the utilitarian point but it’s not itself compromised.) I’ll also admit that I don’t have a ready answer for it!
October 31, 2011 at 12:57 pm
[...] the way, I mentioned my interest in antinatalism. I should say that – despite occasional flippancy – it isn’t in a nihilistic or, [...]