Brian Flynn, whose brother was killed in the Lockerbie disaster, sets out the case against Megrahi…

1. Libya had the motivation to carry out the attack due to the US raid on Tripoli in 1986.
2. In September 1989 Libyan agents bombed a French flight over Africa.
3. Libyan officials received 20 sophisticated timers from MEBO. A fragment of one was among debris found at Lockerbie.
4. Libyan officials were trying to get additional timers in December 1988 and only “cancelled” their order when they said they “had what they needed.”
5. Megrahi was a member of the Libyan Intelligence Service.
6. Megrahi traveled to Malta on December 7, 1988 and purchased clothing and other items from a shop which ended up at Lockerbie.
7. The Fhimah diary (co-conspirator) documented that he had accomplished the task of obtaining “taggs” from Air Malta in mid December 1988.
8. Fhimah’s airside access badge, good until December 31, 1988 was found in a desk which he used after that date indicating he had it in December 1988.
9. Fhimah and Megrahi traveled from Tripoli to Malta together on the evening of December 20, 1988
10. Megrahi traveled with Fhimah on his false Abdusamad passport and stayed in Malta less than 24 hours.
11. Megrahi had a connection to the Swiss company, MEBO, which made the timer.
12. The Libyan leader claimed in February 2001, he would let the world know the truth about Lockerbie in a few days time and that has never happened
13. Libya took responsibilities for the actions of its agents.

Rolfe, a tireless member of the JREF forums, offers her comments…

1. Motive does not prove criminality. Iran had just as good a motive as regards the shooting down of IA655 by the USS Vincennes earlier in 1988. One of these actions went unavenged – which was it? (I might at this point note that Margaret Thatcher, who was in a position to know, stated in her memoirs that the 1986 raid on Tripoli had succeeded in stopping Libyan terrorism and the country had not carried out a significant terrorist attack since then.)
2. And? The relevance of this point completely escapes me. Did anyone suggest Libya was not a terrorist state? Maybe someone should have told Maggie about that one, or perhaps dead Frogs don’t count.
3. These 20 timers were supplied in 1986. Later, two were found in Togo and two in Senegal. Libya was well known for acting as “quartermaster to the world’s terrorists” at that time. It supplied much of the armaments used by the IRA at that point. There is no particular reason why a fragment of MST-13 timer would even point to a specific Libyan operation. It certainly has no bearing on whether Abdelbaset al-Megrahi was involved in smuggling a bomb on KM180 on 21st December 1988.
4. And? Maybe they’d sold them all. Maybe they then secured a supply of a sutable alternative product. This has nothing to do with whether Abdelbaset al-Megrahi was involved in smuggling a bomb on KM180 on 21st December 1988.
5. Agreed. So were a lot of other people. That doesn’t in any way implicate him in the events of 21st December 1988.
6. No, he really didn’t. The evidence of Tony Gauci describes a purchaser at least 10 years older than Megrahi, significantly taller and of much heavier build. Tony was consistently shown pictures of men younger than his description, and encouraged to pick out someone who resembled the purchaser. He originally picked out Abu Talb on that basis, and although he later also agreed Megrahi resembled the purchaser, he qualified this by saying that Abu Talb was a better resemblance. At the identity parade, by which time he’d learned to pick Megrahi out by looking at press photographs, he said Megrahi was not the man he saw in his shop but he looked like him. As regards the day of the purchase, 7th December was a poor match for Tony’s recollection. His initial recollection was that the Christmas lights were not yet lit and it was raining slightly. The Christmas lights were lit on 6th December and there was no rain recorded at the airport that evening, only three miles away. Perusal of Tony’s evidence shows him backtracking on a number of points he was quite sure about initially, for example the Christmas lights, and the age and height of the purchaser. This becomes easier to explain when it is revealed that both Tony and his brother were anxious to receive a reward for getting the identification right, and knew that life-changing sums of money were available. After the trial, Tony was paid “in excess of $2 million” and Paul “in excess of $1 million” – the latter not for giving evidence, because he didn’t, but for “maintaining the resolve of his brother”. It’s clear that Paul was coaching Tony on the identification.
7. Fhimah turned over his diary voluntarily to investigators two years after the disaster. The point about the “taggs” entry was fully explored at the trial and discounted by the judges. There was evidence to support his explanation that he wanted samples to show to a printer.
8. There was no evidence at all to place Fhimah at Luqa airport on the morning of 21st December. So his possession of an airside pass is irrelevant. Several witnesses (e.g. the Air Malta check-in girl) knew Fhimah well by sight. None had seen him that morning.
9. Lots of people travelled to Malta from lots of places on 20th December. Are you going to accuse them all of being the bomber?
10. Megrahi had used the Abdusamad passport in the past, and it was never shown he had used it for any illegal activities. Its use on 20th/21st December suggests he was engaged in something undercover at that time. This may well explain why he never stated the purpose of his journey. It might be circumstantial evidence of involvement if the bomb started its journey in Malta. Which, as they say, is required to be proved.
11. No doubt many people had a connection to MEBO. Megrahi was never shown to have had any connection with bomb-making or terrorist activities, nor to have been in possession of any of these timers.
12. Huh? Gadaffi said something dramatic he never followed up on? Sorry, can you get any more tenuous?
13. Libya wrote that letter as a political move to bring to an end the sanctions imposed on the country following the suspicions regarding Lockerbie. They were “playing with words” (Saif al-Islam). It’s easy to take responsibility for the actions of your agents if you tacitly reserve the right to deny that your agents actually performed the actions in question.

This was a public service blogpost.